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Summoning to court: ordines iudiciarii and Swedish medieval legislation 
 
Abstract 
The development of the law of summons demonstrates how the latest international innovations in 
procedural law, which the twelfth- and thirteenth-century canonists had developed, were adopted 
first in the Swedish provincial laws and then in the laws of the realm. The canon law of summons, 
adopted in the Swedish medieval laws, was part of two broader developments. First, the rules on 
summons were probably part of the canon law idea of ordo iudiciarius, which was also adopted in 
Sweden. In Sweden, the rules on summons were always accompanied by a separate procedural 
chapter, which regulated the whole procedure chronologically from beginning to end – although 
some laws were more elaborate on some details than others were. The article suggests that the 
procedural chapters were in fact the Swedish equivalent of ordines, although the Swedish ‘ordines’ 
were of course legislation, not scholarly literature. Second, the Swedish ‘ordines iudiciarii’ with 
their rules on summons reflect inquisitorial principle and canon law influence making its way into 
the Swedish procedure. The Swedish rulers, just as their counterparts elsewhere in Europe, were 
making a conscious effort to organise court procedures into more uniform and efficient form.  
 




The law of summons, or citation, is about making sure that parties to a legal case appear in court. 
Without a working system of summons, legal proceedings function poorly. The rules on how, when 
and where parties to lawsuits are to appear, and what happens if they fail to do so, help judicial 
orders function effectively. As medieval and early modern legal literature often expressed it, 
‘summons is the beginning or the fundament of the legal process’.1 
The period from the mid-twelfth to the mid-thirteenth century was a time when the entirety of 
Western law went through fundamental changes. Fomenting the rise of the Church to a well-
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organised European power from the late eleventh century onwards, the canon lawyers of the 
Catholic Church acted as the powerhouse of legal innovation. In addition to producing new law (ius 
novum) in the form of papal letters and scholarly treatises, canon lawyers made use of the 
simultaneous rise universities in Northern Italy and elsewhere.2 As the saying went, ecclesia vivit 
lege Romana. By the thirteenth century, this union of Roman and canon law led to the emergence of 
ius commune, a common law of Europe, which served as a common basis for developing legal 
argumentation and methodology in all parts of Europe which scholarly influence reached. Ius 
commune covered all areas of law, from private law to criminal law and procedure. As for legal 
procedures, the ecclesiastical court system became clearly hierarchical, culminating in the papal 
courts of Rome. After the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, modern modes of proofs such as 
confession, witness statements and documentary evidence – in short, Roman-canonical procedure – 
rapidly replaced archaic forms of proofs such as judicial ordeals. In fact, the abolition of ordeals 
would not have been thinkable without a viable alternative – the Roman-canonical procedure – 
already in place.3 As legal scholars took to work, law of procedure became increasingly 
standardised. Civil and criminal procedures grew apart, as public interest now demanded that courts 
in serious cases of crime act ex officio and inquisitorially, instead of waiting for private actors to 
carry forward their claims.   
The literature on the legal changes of the High Middle Ages and the rise of medieval legal 
scholarship is enormous.4 It is therefore surprising to find important pieces of the ius commune 
procedure yet to receive systematic scholarly treatment. The summons is one such institution.5 
Medieval canon law developed a system of its own to ensure that parties turned up in court on the 
day when their case was heard. This became the law of summons (in ius vocatio or citatio), the 
legal institution which initiated the court proceedings. Around the year 1000, canonists were 
showing increased interest in procedural questions and legal procedure as a whole. From the 
writings of canonists emerged a body of literature usually referred to as ordo iudiciarius or 
iudiciorum, which roughly translates as procedural system or due process. Although he did not yet 
formulate his views on legal procedure systematically, Ivo of Chartres is a good example of the first 
canonists interested in these matters.6 Another important landmark in the history of ordo iudiciarius 
was the letter of Bulgarus to Haimeric, the Chancellor to Pope Innocent II, in the 1130s. The letter 
was the glossator’s response to Haimeric’s request asking Bulgarus to summarise the rules of 
procedure, which he did.7 During the second half of the twelfth century, canonists such as 
Paucapalea, Stephen of Tournai, and Rufinus developed ordines iudiciarii further, establishing the 
basic structure of canon law procedure. The ordines typically presented the legal procedure 
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chronologically, from the summons to the appeals, from A to Z. The procedure described in the 
ordines iudiciarii replaced the earlier procedure based on oaths, compurgators and ordeals.8  
The term ordo iudiciarius began to be used in the papal letters from around the middle of the 
twelfth century. Ordo iudiciarius guaranteed the recipients of those letters that their cases would be 
heard following the rules of the modernised canon law of proof, instead of having to submit 
themselves to ordeals or other older forms of proof. Pope Alexander III was especially active in 
promoting the new procedural forms in his letters to litigants. Although the ordines provided the 
sole lawful procedural guide for the canonical process, during the twelfth century the new 
procedure still advanced slowly.9 After the prohibition of ordeals in 1215, the new procedure began 
to spread more rapidly. Pope Gregory IX’s Liber extra (1234), then, marked an important milestone 
in the development of the ordines towards the massive Speculum iudiciale of Guillielmus Durantis 
(1298). The work of Durantis was the culmination of the development of procedural ius commune.10   
In conjunction with the rest of the procedural ius commune, the law of summons developed in the 
writings of the twelfth- and thirteenth-century canonists, and in the papal legislation of the time.11 
The canon law of procedure profoundly influenced secular law in many parts of Christendom, 
although because they were oral procedures, not usually recorded, it is not easy to chart the early 
influence of the new canonical procedure.12 
In the heartlands of continental Europe, the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were also the time when 
criminal procedure gradually grew apart from civil procedure. Before the thirteenth century (and at 
least not without a considerable degree of anachronism), one cannot really speak of criminal and 
civil procedure separately. The different modes of procedure first developed in the writings of 
canonists and in the practice of ecclesiastical courts. From there, they gradually spread to secular 
jurisdictions. As is usual for large-scale legal transformations, the transition from ordeals to new 
procedural modes occurred at different speeds in different European regions. The precise line 
between criminal and civil cases remained far from clear, and there were large geographical 
differences. Addressing this in detail is beyond the scope of this article, but it is evident that a clear-
cut separation of criminal and civil procedure required learned jurists. As such jurists were in short 
supply, the distinction could not fully develop. This was often the case in the peripheral areas of 
Europe, such as Scandinavia.13  
In the strict sense, the distinct criminal procedure was equal to inquisitorial procedure, which 
applied to severe crimes only. The inquisitorial procedure had emerged in the canon law practice of 
the 1160s, when papal delegates started to take initiative in bringing ill-behaving churchmen to 
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court, whenever ‘rumour’ (fama) called for action. Thus, no longer did the proceedings depend on 
active private accusers.14 From the perspective of criminal procedure distinct from civil procedure, 
this was revolutionary and demanded effective political power. 
The inquisitorial procedure was ‘extraordinary’ (processus extraordinarius). The sanctioning of 
minor crimes continued accusatorially, which remained the default procedure (processus 
ordinarius) and was practically the same as civil procedure. In between these two main modes of 
procedure was the denunciatory procedure, which a judge initiated ex officio and based on a 
denunciation but which then continued in the same way as accusatorial procedure.15 The dividing 
line between the two modes of procedure was otherwise flexible as well, and the court could move 
from inquisitorial to accusatorial procedure, or vice versa, if it was deemed necessary.16 By the end 
of the Middle Ages, inquisitorial procedure had become dominant in many parts of Europe. The 
process of denunciation mostly merged with that of inquisition, which also extended to cover the 
kinds of crimes previously processed accusatorially.  
This article argues that the law of summons in medieval Swedish provincial legislation was a 
transplant of canon law. Since the publication of Alan Watson’s hugely influential book of 1974,17 
legal transplants have caused an enormous amount of discussion in legal history and comparative 
law.18 When referring to connections and influences between legal orders, the notion of legal 
transplantation is now part of any serious, not only comparatist’s, but also legal historian’s, toolbox. 
It is typical for legal transplants that the legal institutions change as they move from one legal order 
to another and need to adapt to new legal and sociopolitical environments.19 This was also true of 
canon law of summons when transplanted to Sweden. Some provincial laws followed canon law 
only roughly, while, as will be shown later, other copied parts of canon law almost verbatim.  
No comprehensive study has been written on the influence of canon law on medieval Swedish legal 
procedure. Because this article will only concentrate on one legal institution, it obviously cannot 
fully remedy the lack. The emergence of a law of summons in Sweden is, however, crucially 
important in the construction of medieval law as an increasingly centralised normative system, 
which during the late Middle Ages gradually replaced a legal procedure previously dominated by 
private interests.  
The aim of this article is to discuss to what extent the canon law of summons found its way into 
Swedish medieval laws.20 Why did summons appear only in some of the provincial laws, but not in 
all of them? How did the Swedish law of summons come to differ from canon law, the procedural 
system of which was profoundly different from the Swedish system? To what extent was the 
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medieval Swedish law of summons part of something that can be described as Swedish ordo 
iudiciarius? 
This article first describes the medieval canon law of summons, after which the background of 
Swedish medieval law is explained. The article then moves on to the law of summons such as it 
emerged in medieval Swedish legislation. Before the conclusions, the possibility of Danish 
influence on Swedish law of summons is discussed. 
 
The canon law of summons 
 
The law of summons was part of the canon law of procedure, which, as part of the European ius 
commune, had a profound impact on law almost everywhere in Europe. Canon law of procedure 
strongly influenced secular laws of medieval Europe, and rules of summons were no exception. As 
was often the case, local variations of common themes occurred. Joanna Carraway Vitiello 
describes the citation procedures in the town of Reggio in northern Italy: according to the town 
statutes, a blast of trumpet accompanied the summons so that the whole neighbourhood became 
aware of what was happening and of the details of the legal case.21 
It is, however, now more important to look at the law in books. Canonists considered summons 
(citatio) as part of the preparatory phase (praeparatoria iudiciorum) leading to the actual legal 
proceedings (instantia). Before obtaining summons, the plaintiff needed to hand in a libel letter 
(libellus) to the judge. In case he would lose the case, the plaintiff needed to promise a cautio, 
usually reinforced by a guarantee (cautio fideiussoria). If the plaintiff had no money, he would need 
to take an oath instead (cautio iuratoria). As so often, ius commune literature was full of different 
opinions as to the details concerning the form of the libel, the cautio, and the guarantee, and as to 
the exceptions to the main rules.22 For the purposes of this article, the differences in these details are 
not crucial. However, it is important to note that a whole scholarship and practice of preparatory 
measures existed in ius commune. It was to this context of civil procedure that the institution of 
summons originally belonged.  
Kenneth Pennington has observed that the jurists of the second half of the twelfth century were 
‘conscious of the defendant’s right to a trial’ and not only that, but to ‘a trial conducted according to 
the rules of ordo iudiciarius’. Paucapalea, in his Summa, linked the ecclesiastical procedure to the 
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story of Adam and Eve at Genesis 3:12, in which God ‘summons’ Adam to reply to a ‘charge’ 
concerning the forbidden fruit, and Adam then ‘pleads’ innocent.  
Stephen of Tournai was the first canonist to define the different elements of the ordo in more detail. 
The essential contents of the ordines are already encapsulated in Stephen’s Summa, upon which 
later canonists expanded:  
‘The defendant shall be summoned before his own judges and be legitimately called 
by three edicts or one peremptory edict. He must be permitted to have legitimate 
delays. The accusation must be formally presented in writing. Legitimate witnesses 
must be produced. A decision may be rendered only after someone has been convicted 
or confessed. The decision must be in writing.’23 
The elements of the ordo can thus be listed as follows: 1. The defendant’s right to be summoned 2. 
before his own judge, and 3. by a certain number of summons. 4. Legitimate delays are permitted. 
5. Witnesses are needed. 6. The court can decide the case only after it has examined it, and 7. the 
decision needs to be in writing. 
After Stephen, the ordines grew in number and in the degree of detail. The more the Church wished 
to get rid of the old system of proof based on ordeals and oaths, the more necessary it became to 
define the alternative as clearly as possible. The prohibition of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 
against churchmen participating in ordeals was an important milestone here, too.  
Tancred of Bologna’s influential ordo iudiciarius dates to around that time, between 1214 and 
1216. His treatise included a separate chapter on citation, which treated the subject at length. 
Following Tancred’s example, citation became one of the standard topics of thirteenth century 
procedural literature.24  
The Church’s most important law book, Pope Gregory IX’s decretal collection Liber extra (1234) 
already takes it for granted that defendants need to be summoned to court. The second book, 
although otherwise arranged according to the chronological order of the trial, treats citation in 
connection with contumacy and only at the end of the book.25 However, the decretal collection does 
not specify one particular right way of citation. Liber extra leaves the details of summoning to 
scholars and local customs. Starting with Hostiensis, decretalists commented on Liber extra, and, 
relying on earlier canonists’ work, further elaborated the rules of citation.26  
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Authors of ordines iudiciarii habitually treated the subject of summons. Most of the rules on 
citation and its effects followed the Law of Justinian, while the original input of canon law was not 
as significant as in some other branches of law.27 The canonists considered summons an essential 
part of the preparatory measures leading to trial (principium et fundamentum causae). Without a 
legal summons, the decision of a court was invalid. Summons was an official act and thus 
performed by the judge. There were limits as to who could be summoned to court (ratione 
personarum) and when (ratione temporis). Many authors agreed that one could not be summoned 
during festive days, war, one’s own wedding, while attending a funeral or another trial. Priests 
during religious ceremonies, monks, high officials and papal legates could not be summoned. 
Because of ‘reverence and honour’ attached to their person, some others could only be summoned 
with the court’s permission. These people included parents or patrons of the plaintiff.28 
When a judge decided to issue a summons, he in fact declared the case admissible. Inversely, if he 
did not agree to issue a summons, it meant that the case was not admissible. In this case, the libel 
letter was normally returned. If the summons was issued, either the judge himself or his assistants 
delivered it to the summoned party. The summoning was usually done in written form (libellus 
citationis), although some authors allowed for an oral summons. Surprisingly, most ius commune 
authors did not specify how much time was to be reserved for the summoned party to appear in 
court. Some, however, did mention a minimum time, which depended on the distance between the 
location where the summoned resided and the court. Canon law included more precise procedural 
deadlines (induciae citatoriae), which depended on the distance to court, the status of the parties, 
and the nature of the case. The main customary rule was, however, that the deadlines belonged to 
the arbitrary powers of the judge.29  
The number of citations was one of the points that was much discussed. There were many 
variations. According to some there were to be three citations, while others thought one or two 
sufficed. Some authors were prepared to leave the amount of citations to the judge’s arbitration. 
Only the last citation was usually peremptory, the absence of the summoned party thus leading to 
contumacy, but some authors were willing to allow two or even three peremptory citations. 
Sanctions were attached to peremptory citations. Most often, a 30-day period was required between 
issuing the edicts (the technical term often used for citation), but intervals of many other lengths 
appear in the literature, and some authors leave the length of the period between edicts for the judge 
to decide.30 
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After the citation and the libel letter had been given to the summoned, the case was considered 
formally initiated. The same case could no longer be filed in another court, and the claims presented 
in the libel could not be changed. Counting from the moment of receiving the citation, the 
summoned party was given a time limit to answer to the charges (induciae deliberatoriae). This 
was, following again the Law of Justinian, 20 days, but the time limit was generally considered a 
matter of judicial arbitration. If no induciae deliberatoriae was given, the ensuing litis contestation 
and the final decision were null and void. The cited party could also present a counterclaim, in 
which case the first plaintiff was also entitled to file his answer within a specified time limit.31 
How were the rules laid out in the literature that followed legal practice? Little information exists as 
to how the citation worked in practice, because the summons phase of the proceeding was normally 
not recorded in the ‘acta’. Although literature suggests this possibility, written libels were, 
according to Donahue, probably not presented to the judge in this first phase. This is because the 
minutes of the ecclesiastical courts usually mention that the libel was introduced to the courts only 
after the defendant had appeared.32 
Did it make a difference from the point of view of citation whether the process was civil or 
criminal, or inquisitorial or accusatorial? When the first ordines were written in the second half of 
the twelfth century, the distinction between civil and criminal procedure was just developing; by the 
end of the thirteenth century, the distinction was fully developed.33 Yet, the similarities between 
civil and criminal procedure of the ius commune were far more important than the differences.34  
Thus, the ius commune authors do not seem to make a distinction between civil and criminal cases 
as to whether a defendant should be summoned. Those accused of a crime needed to receive a 
summons as well, as Tancred noted in his Summula de criminibus.35 According to Tancred, even 
those charged with notorious crimes had to be summoned, even though the rules of ordo did not 
otherwise all apply. Tancred, however, does not specify how the citation was to be performed,36 nor 
is the mode of citation explained in detail in any of the central decretals regulating inquisitorial 
procedure, such as Licet heli (1199) or Qualiter et quando (1215). One may assume that citation 
was in practice less significant in inquisitorial cases, which began ex officio and in which 
proceedings often started by taking the defendant into custody. Massimo Vallerani, in his important 
study on the criminal law practice of late medieval Bologna and Perugia, does not even mention 
citation.37 
For the purposes of this article, however, the extent to which summons figured in civil as opposed 
to criminal cases is not important. As we will see in what follows, the difference between criminal 
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and civil procedure did not yet emerge in medieval Swedish laws. Swedish political powers, when 
the medieval laws were drafted, were not yet strong enough to extend ex officio proceedings much, 
but instead had to limit it to some exceptional cases which threatened the social order. A systematic 
distinction between civil and criminal procedure would also have required legal scholarship, which 
did not exist.  
The main observation from the point of view of this article is that a large literature emerged around 
the institution of summons. It was, furthermore, an integral part of the procedural teachings of ius 
commune, teachings that covered the entire procedure from beginning to end. Taking one piece of 
this complicated regulation and adding that piece to a completely different legal tradition was not a 
straightforward task of legal transplantation. Yet this is precisely what was done when the rules of 
citation were introduced into medieval Swedish legislation.  
 
The Swedish ordines iudiciarii? 
 
To what extent is the development towards increased interest in procedural questions discernible in 
Sweden? The main channel through which the Church sought to influence the local law was 
provincial legislation.38 Of course the ‘general’ canon law was, at least in theory, the common law 
for all of Christendom, Sweden included. However, local variations were allowed and common.39 
Canon law needed local implementation. In practice, the highly developed system of Church law 
was dependent on learned jurists, which were in short supply in peripheral areas such as Sweden. 
To ensure that its legal rules gained significance at the local level, it was prudent for the Church to 
attempt to influence the contents of the provincial laws directly. This practical solution necessarily 
involved compromises, leaving aside the finer details of canon law and introducing only the 
features that were considered the most essential.  
The Swedish medieval provincial laws were put into writing during the thirteenth and early 
fourteenth centuries, during the period from the 1220s to about the 1340s. Together with the Saxon 
Mirror, Coutumes de Beauvaisis and the Siete Partidas, the Swedish provincial laws thus belong to 
the wave of European law books that followed the model of written law exemplified by the Liber 
extra.40 
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The laws of the neighbouring Scandinavian countries are even older than the Swedish ones. Both 
Denmark and Norway experienced an earlier move towards state building and centralisation of 
royal power than Sweden. Centralisation and state building, in turn, intimately link with legislative 
powers. Not surprisingly, the Norwegian, Icelandic, and Danish provincial laws are older than the 
Swedish ones, and date roughly to the same or even an earlier period than the German, French, and 
Castilian examples mentioned above.41 The earliest Norwegian provincial laws (the Laws of 
Gulating and Frostating) presumably date to the early twelfth century, as does probably the oldest 
written Icelandic law, the Hafliđaskrá. The Danish provincial laws (those of Scania, Zealand, and 
Jutland) date to the first half of the thirteenth century.42  
All of these laws – both the continental and the Nordic ones – mix, in different proportions, 
customary law with elements of emerging royal and canon law.43 Scholars have, however, 
disagreed as to what the actual proportions are. Elsa Sjöholm famously argued that all medieval 
legislation, including the Nordic laws, was based on Mosaic law and thus consists entirely of new 
normative material.44 Although it led to intensive discussion, Sjöholm’s position at its most extreme 
does not correspond to the present state of scholarship. Scholars such as Per Andersen, Inger 
Dübeck, Mia Korpiola, and Helle Vogt have considerably modified Sjöholm’s thesis, whereas 
others allow customary law even more space.45 Stefan Brink, Gisli Sigurdsson, and Jørn Øyrehagen 
Sunde represent the latter group.46 Despite the differences in opinion as to how much customary 
law the provincial laws include, it is now commonly accepted that the laws do not directly represent 
the state of medieval customary law. Describing the scholarly consensus, Fredrik Ljungvist 
concludes that the laws consist of a mix between ‘older domestic customary law, and more active 
royal and ecclesiastic law-giving with loans from continental, Roman, and canon law, and the 
influence of the latter grows successively in time.’47 In addition to these, some elements may have 
been borrowed from the Danish or Norwegian laws.48 
Thus the Swedish provincial laws were essentially mixed compilations of customary law and newer 
elements, but the interests of the Church and the crown were also clearly reflected in many of the 
solutions of the provincial laws.49 A steady increase of royal power at the cost of local communities 
was clearly visible, as one compares the provincial laws with the first realm-wide laws from the 
mid-fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.50  
None of the existing manuscripts dates to earlier than the 1280s, which means that the Swedish laws 
were written down later than their Danish and Norwegian counterparts. This is a fair assessment, 
although it is sometimes tricky to determine which of the provincial laws are older and which are 
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younger. Additions and changes were sometimes made to later manuscripts, and normative 
materials may date to earlier oral (and sometimes written) traditions, which are difficult to trace. 
With this in mind, the following datings correspond to the prevailing scholarly opinion.51  
Of the nine provincial laws existing in part or in their entirety, the laws of Gotland (Gutalagen)52 
and the older of the two versions of the laws of West Gothia (Äldre Västgötalagen) were probably 
compiled some time in the 1220s.53 The laws of East Gothia (Östgötalagen) may have been put into 
writing around the same time, but the only existing manuscript contains a version no earlier than 
from the 1280s.54 After the local assemblies of the province had accepted the proposed law, the 
king ratified the Law of Uppland in 1296.55 The Laws of Västmanland (Västmannalagen) and 
Dalarna (Dalalagen), in the versions still existing, were partly transcripts of the Law of Uppland, 
although the Law of Dalarna was originally much older and remained in parts strikingly archaic.56 
The Law of Hälsingland (Hälsingelagen) also incorporated parts of the Law of Uppland and was 
compiled no earlier than in the 1320s.57 The dating of the Law of Södermanland 
(Södermannalagen) has caused some disagreement among scholars. The newer of the two existing 
manuscripts is from 1325 and received royal confirmation in 1327, while the older manuscript may 
be either from the 1280s or from a period later than that of the Law of Uppland.58  
The provincial laws can be roughly divided into an older and a newer layer. The older layer refers 
to the Laws of West Gothia and Gutalagen, whereas the newer layer includes all the rest, that is, the 
Law of Uppland59 and those that were, at least to some extent, modelled after it.60 It is, nevertheless, 
good to keep in mind the difficulties involved in this division. The survival of manuscripts is 
altogether a different matter from the dating of a law’s initial drafting, and even if the initial draft 
can be dated, it tells us little about the origin of the legal norms themselves. Law manuscripts were 
not monuments but living documents in that changes and additions were often included in newer 
versions. As Stefan Brink has shown concretely for the Law of Hälsingland, the normative 
ingredients of the provincial laws often came from various sources. Hälsingland’s law was probably 
put into writing at the order of the Archbishop of Uppsala, Olof, whose entourage may well have 
included Danish clerics versed in canon law. It is, therefore, understandable that many parts of the 
Hälsingland law are similar and even identical with the Uppsala law. However, as Brink shows, the 
drafters of the new law could not neglect the early customary law, which they must have had at 
their disposal in either oral or even written form. Furthermore, Norwegian influence is visible in the 
legal terminology of the Law of Hälsingland.61  
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All provincial laws, except for the Gutalagen, included a separate chapter on church law, regulating 
matters such as church jurisdiction, crimes against the church, marriage, and other matters 
pertaining to canon law. Furthermore, canon law influenced not only chapters on church laws but 
also other parts of the laws. This article, however, leaves the procedure of the ecclesiastical courts 
aside and concentrates on the influence of canon law on secular procedure. It would be interesting 
to know how these norms worked in daily court practice. Unfortunately, however, almost no 
information on the legal practice of secular courts remains on these questions, and we will need to 
rely on the law texts alone.  
Most of the provincial laws have a chapter on procedure (rättegångsbalk). This is the case with the 
newer laws, such as the Law of Uppland, the Law of Dalarna and the Law of Västmanland. The 
first laws of the realm, the Law of the Realm for the Countryside and the Law of the Realm for the 
Town (both from the 1350s), also have procedural chapters. The oldest provincial laws – those of 
Gotland and West Gothia – do not contain such a chapter. Instead, isolated procedural provisions 
are scattered in different parts of the law.62  
Could these chapters be interpreted as the provincial law-drafters’ wish to include an ordo 
iudiciarius in the secular laws? The mere emergence of separate procedural chapters in the Swedish 
medieval laws is most likely a sign of an increased sensitivity towards procedural matters. The 
division into procedural and substantive law remained far from clear-cut; instead, procedural rules 
still often appeared in connection with the rules of substantive law.  
However, the central idea behind the procedural chapters of the Swedish laws is the same as that of 
ordines iudiciarii: the procedures are described from the beginning (often summons) to the end (the 
court decision). Differences in details abound, not only between the Swedish laws and canon law, 
but also between the different Swedish laws. The trend is nevertheless clear: striving towards 
material truth increased, and this goal was advanced with the help of an organised, efficient 
procedure.  
A change in law of evidence was also on the way and had in fact been so since the Fourth Lateran 
Council of 1215, when the Church forbade ecclesiastic persons from partaking in ordeals 63 As Per 
Andersen has shown, this caused important changes in Denmark, where ordeals gave way to 
juries.64 Sweden was no different. Only some provincial laws mention ordeals, slowly but surely on 
their way out.65 According to the Law of East Gothia (Chapter on Inheritance, Art. 17), regent 
Birger Jarl (r. 1248-1266) had prohibited ordeals. Scholars assume that this had occurred around 
1250, when Cardinal William of Modena (also known as William of Sabina, 1184-1251) visited 
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Scandinavia.66 Apparently, it took time to uproot the custom. The Law of Hälsingland mentions that 
both Kings Magnus Ladulås (r. 1275-1290) and Birger Magnusson (r. 1290-1318) had again 
prohibited the ordeal of hot iron. Then, ‘because Archbishop Olof had complained that the ordeal of 
hot iron had returned in Hälsingland’, King Magnus Eriksson (r. 1319-1364) once more prohibited 
the ordeal.67  
By the time provincial laws were put into writing, canon law of proof had thus started exerting 
influence on legal procedures and pushing old modes of proof aside. Despite the changes that had 
occurred, the procedural chapters of the Swedish laws still looked worlds apart from the learned 
canon law of procedure of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The Swedish laws typically dealt 
with how judges and juries were chosen, when and where court sessions were held, and how oaths 
were taken. This was an oral procedure, and, therefore, the procedural chapters remain silent on 
things like written charges, exceptions and replications. Witnesses and written proof played little or 
no role in this archaic procedure based on oaths and compurgators. The hierarchical court structure 
of the Church allowed for the Roman-canon appeals system (appellatio) to develop, in which an 
upper court handled the appeal (‘devolutive’ effect) while the lower court’s decision could not be 
enforced while the appeal was pending (‘suspensive’ effect). Whatever little the provincial laws 
contained on remedies akin to appeal, they were based on a different logic than that of the ius 
commune.68   
That said, it seems likely that the increased procedural interest of the Swedish compilers was the 
influence of canon law. The reasons behind the need to articulate the procedural rules more clearly 
could also be the same: to help new and more efficient rules of proof, not embedded in the customs, 
to take firm root. Although the Swedish procedure remained archaic, it was in a state of change. 
 
The law of summons in the provincial laws  
 
In medieval Sweden, the ting, the local administrative and judicial assembly, formed the fundament 
of the judicial structure in the rural countryside. When deciding legal cases, the assembly consisted 
of the local district judge and 12 jurors (nämndemän), all without formal legal training but a 
practical knowledge of the law.69 The Swedish secular courts were to remain largely different from 
those of southern and western Europe. Whereas learned lawyers gradually took over the (central) 
courts in Italy, Spain and southern France from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and Germany 
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from the fifteenth century onwards, the Swedish courts remained lay-dominated until modernity. 
The court sessions were oral, and no minutes were kept. From the point of view of this article, it is 
essential to note that medieval Swedish secular courts included no legal professionals as either 
judges, scribes or advocates. The Church and royal central administration employed the few learned 
lawyers. Obviously, this had a profound effect on how and to what extent the ius commune could 
influence Swedish law.70 
Some kind of citation must always have been in use in the rural ting, regardless of whether a 
provincial law mentioned anything about how it was delivered and what its legal consequences 
were. Swedish historians Åke Holmbäck and Elias Wessén71 point out that there were three ways of 
summoning defendants to the local ting. In former times, when everyone was present at the ting,72 it 
was thinkable to cite people at the assembly itself. Later, when assemblies had become a burden for 
the peasant73 estate, the assemblies had to be summoned by either the plaintiff himself, his or her  
representative, or a royal sheriff (länsman).74  
The argument of this article is that summoning as a legal institution was taken over from canon law. 
The old Swedish word ‘stämma’ (lit. ‘convene’)75 was then given a new legal meaning, as it now 
began to serve as a translation for the ius commune term citatio or in ius vocation.76 We do not 
know, however, what the exact legal use of stämma was before it acquired this new meaning. The 
term may have carried several different meanings, one of which could have been to demand an 
opposing party to appear at the ting. 
The older layer of provincial laws does not yet have an ordo iudiciarius in the form of a procedural 
chapter, nor does it have a canon law type of summons. The Laws of West Gothia thus contain no 
rules on citation. The same is true for the Law of Västmanland. In the Laws of West Gothia, an 
obscure institution called ‘the seven nights’ (sjunätting) appears, which was apparently a 
preparatory meeting taking place on the eighth day after an offence occurred, so that seven nights 
had passed. The plaintiff informed the defendant of the charges, and evidence and oaths were taken. 
After that, if no settlement was reached, the defendant was probably summoned to an ordinary court 
session, although in some cases the sjunätting may also have given the final decision. The Laws 
contain, however, no information as to how the defendant was summoned to the sjunätting or to the 
ensuing ting session.77 
The Law of Gotland (Gutalagen) has no procedural chapter either and no rules on summoning. 
Nevertheless, some of its articles make clear that citation was used to make a defendant appear at a 
court assembly. For instance, Art. 30 (Om pant [On guarantee]) says that ‘if you have taken a 
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guarantee from someone for a real debt, then cite him to church or to the assembly’. Several other 
provisions also mention summons in passing (Art. 31, 32, 38 and 39), but they do not specify how 
citations were carried out. Instead, the law says that if someone did not appear for a land case, it 
could be immediately decided even in his absence (Art. 31).78 
The newer layer of provincial laws usually had a separate procedural chapter, a kind of ordo 
iudiciarius, and they adopted the canonical citation in one form or another.  
The Law of Dalarna does not specifically talk about ‘citation’ or ‘appearing in court’ but instead 
talks of ‘answering’ (svara) to the charges. Understandably, the citation must have been oral and 
probably given through the jury members who normally acted as summoners.79  
The system of citation in the Law of Dalarna (Chapter on Procedure, Art. 5) was rather tolerant 
towards defendants. After the sheriff (länsman) or plaintiff had cited the defendant, he or she was 
given three chances to appear at the court assembly – apparently a form of canon law citation. If the 
defendant did not appear at the first, second or third ting, he or she was fined and the fine was 
seized. The defendant was then given three more chances. If he or she still did not appear at the 
following two sessions, the defendant was condemned in the actual case at the third (or sixth). 
Altogether, the defendant could thus skip five sessions and only had to appear at the sixth.80  
The Law of Södermanland, in its procedural chapter, allowed the defendant three chances to appear 
in court (Chapter on Procedure, Art. 4). Although the law does not specify how summons was 
carried out, the rules are otherwise detailed. The law enumerates the lawful reasons for the 
defendant’s absence: sickness, death in the family (‘if he has a dead person in his house’), having to 
search for runaway cattle, fire (‘if fire is higher than it should be’), and being on a king’s mission. 
The defendant needed two witnesses to prove the reason for his absence, and if he or she  was able 
to provide them, the defendant was entitled to a fourth chance. If the defendant had no reason for 
the absence, the judge would order a ting session to take place at his or her house, and the defendant 
would be fined. In case the defendant still did not answer to the charges, the fines would be seized 
and a fourth court session arranged. If the defendant still did not cooperate, he or she would be 
fined again and – although this is not quite clear – tried on the main charge.81  
The law primarily observed in this section is the Law of Uppland, the oldest surviving manuscript 
of which dates to the last years of the thirteenth century. The Law of Uppland gained special status 
among the provincial laws, because it was the law in the region surrounding Stockholm and 
Uppland, where both the king and the archbishop largely resided. The king also promulgated the 
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Law of Uppland in 1296, and the commission in charge of compiling the law included ecclesiastical 
representation. The Law of East Gothia represents a somewhat newer layer of legislation, and this 
law was also compiled with the help of ecclesiastics. 
Article III of the Procedural Chapter of the Law of Uppland sets out the rules regarding summons to 
the court. The defendant was allowed three chances to appear in court. Thus, in the Law of Uppland 
the third citation was the peremptory one leading to severe consequences. The source of this rule is 
clear, because the rule of the three summons was common in canon law. Already according to 
Gratian, the defendant had to be cited three times (‘debet autem illum citare tribus edictis aut uno 
peremptorio pro omnibus’).82 As explained above, twelfth-century authors of canon law offered 
many other solutions: some were willing to allow only one peremptory edict, while others were 
willing to allow two. The Uppland legislator, however, followed the line of Gratian, which had 
become dominant, probably not least because it was endorsed by Hostiensis, the leading canonist of 
the thirteenth century. The origin of the Uppland law of summons becomes especially clear when 
we look at the rest of the passage in the Law of Uppland: If the defendant missed all three of his 
chances to appear in court, the proceedings would be taken ‘to his farm’ (till hans gård).83 The law 
here is a direct copy of canon law. According to Liber extra, if the defendant did not appear in 
court, the case was taken to his domicile (‘deferentur citationes ad domicilium eius’).84 The 
corresponding canon law of summons appears in Scientiam, an ordo from the late 1230s and of 
French origin,85 and in Summa Aurea of Hostiensis.86  
What were the consequences of contumacy? If the defendant failed to appear at this fourth session, 
the judge would seize his property: ‘Now he fails to appear as before; then the judges shall in the 
same session order an seizure at his farm, every seizure according to the nature of the goods (Nu 
þryzkæs han sum fyrre, þa a domæri a samu þingi mæt I garþ hans dömæ, hwart mæt æptir sinni 
sak.)’. The seizure did not, however, convert the seized property into that of the plaintiff. Instead, 
the defendant got a chance to defend himself in one of the next three court sessions.87  
Again, this Uppland rule was transplanted directly from canon law. According to Scientiam, the 
plaintiff should ‘petition to the judge to seize the possession of the defendant … distinguishing 
between real and personal actions’ (‘…actor debet petere a iudice, ut mittatur in possessionem 
causa rei servandae, habita tamen distinctione, utrum agatur reali aut personali’).88  
As in the Law of Uppland, in canon law the seizure did not automatically make the plaintiff the 
owner of the seized goods. He only became a true owner if the defendant did not appear within one 
year to claim his possessions (‘… qui missus est in possessionem causa rei servandae, non efficitur 
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verus possessor, si reus infra annum venerit et noluerit comparare nec stare iudicio…’).89 The 
goods were thus appropriated as a guarantee. The canon law of summons is presented similarly at 
least in the ordo iudiciarius of Ricardus Anglicus, probably of the Bolognese school and dated to 
1196.90 Also in North Italian town laws, contumacy could result in the seizure of goods.91 
The basic structure of the law of summons is thus the same in the Uppland law and canon law. 
Some of the details differ, though, which is understandable considering the different procedural 
backgrounds to which the institution of citation belonged in canon law and the Uppland law. 
Whereas the Uppland law dwells at length on the role of the compurgators in the court’s sessions 
following the seizure at the defendant’s domicile, canon law (such as it is represented in some of 
the ordines, for instance Scientiam) distinguishes between real and personal actions as far as the 
seizure is concerned. Whereas the canon law of summons was in the hands of professionals, in 
Uppland law the role of the local community was pivotal. Therefore, the Uppland law has 
compurgators while canon law does not. On the other hand, canon law refers to different actions 
pertaining to real and personal goods, while Uppland more vaguely states that the judge must 
consider the different ‘nature of goods’. The differences, hardly surprisingly, result from the legal 
institution being transplanted to an environment that is different from its origin.   
The Law of Uppland was the leading provincial law in that many of its solutions were used 
verbatim in other provincial laws, and eventually in the laws of the realm. The Law of Uppland also 
served as the main channel through which the material contents of medieval Swedish provincial 
laws were finally transmitted to the Law of the Realm of 1734. It also follows the systematics of the 
Law of Uppland.   
The Law of East Gothia, unlike the other provincial laws, describes the actual summoning. 
According to the Law (Chapter on Procedure, Art. 21), when a peasant wanted to sue another 
peasant, he needed to go to the future defendant’s homestead accompanied by two men (apparently 
as witnesses). The summoning had to occur between sunrise and sundown. The same two witnesses 
needed to come to the actual court session. A peasant could only summon one defendant per day, 
whereas the king or bishop’s prosecutor could summon three.92  
The Law of Hälsingland (Chapter on Procedure, Art. 3), which according to common understanding 
belongs to the latest of the provincial laws, is the most efficient of all. The defendant had only one 
chance to appear in court; if he failed to appear, he was fined. In case the defendant denied having 
ever received a summons, the plaintiff had to prove citation by two witnesses and 14 compurgators. 
It was also possible to cite a defendant at church or directly at the court assembly (as was the case 
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according to the Law of Uppland), in which case no proof was needed. One might say that the 
citation in these last two cases, church and court assembly, was notorious.93  
The Law of the Realm of King Magnus Eriksson from around the mid-fourteenth century was the 
first statute covering the entire Kingdom (except for towns). As for its sources, the Law of the 
Realm was heavily based on the provincial laws of East Gothia, Uppland, Västmanland and 
Södermanland, while Magnus Eriksson’s earlier statute law played an important role as well.94 The 
Law of the Realm of Magnus Eriksson adopted the same system of citation as the Law of Dalarna: 
both laws gave the defendant six chances to appear in court. The Law of the Realm, however, also 
specified how the actual citing took place exactly the same way that the Law of East Gothia did. 
According to the Law of Realm (Chapter on Procedure, Art. 9), the plaintiff had first to go to the 
defendant’s homestead with two witnesses and cite him, telling him what he was charged for..95 
The Law of King Christopher of 1442 was the next realm-wide law given after Magnus Eriksson’s 
Law of the Realm, although it can also be argued that the former was only a revised version of the 
latter. According to previous studies, about 80% of the normative material of the new law was 
copied from the Law of Magnus Eriksson. The remaining 20% mainly represent the tightening of 
penal law. Harsher penal law, in turn, has been seen to be the result or a means of centralising 
political power.96 The tightening grip of political power was also reflected in the way summons to 
court was devised in the new law.  
The Law of King Christopher followed the canon law based technical solution that the Law of 
Dalarna and Magnus Eriksson’s Law of the Realm had presented, but the new law allowed for 
much less flexibility. For the first time, the judge himself was now primarily responsible for the 
summons, which is a turn towards a more inquisitorial procedure. The plaintiff, then, was only the 
lawgiver’s secondary choice to deliver the summons. Chapter of Procedure, Art 12 (pr.) states that 
‘the one in charge of judging must, in the presence of two witnesses, cite the one being sued, if he is 
close enough, or give the plaintiff two [ ---] men, so that they may cite the one being sued, wherever 
they meet him.’ If necessary, the plaintiff and the two men would need to go the defendant’s 
homestead in order to deliver the summons, ‘whether he is home or away’.97  
The Law of King Christopher allowed only three citations instead of six. Nor were the court 
assemblies allowed to be idle any more, at least less so than before, for now a consequence was 
attached to every court meeting which the summoned defendant failed to attend. The first time the 
defendant was absent, unless he had sent witnesses to give grounds for legal absence, he was fined. 
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The second time, the plaintiff would present his witnesses, and the absent defendant would be fined 
again. At the third session, the court would try the case, even in the absence of the defendant.98  
 
The Danish connection 
 
Before concluding, the possibility of Danish influence on the Swedish systems of summons merits 
consideration. As mentioned above, the Danish provincial laws were older than the Swedish ones. 
The oldest of the three major Danish provincial laws, the Law of Scania, was written down roughly 
between 1202-16, and the Law of Zealand (the so-called King Erik’s Law of Zealand, clarifying 
and supplementing the older King Valdemar’s Law) after 1220, while King Valdemar II is thought 
to have confirmed the Law of Jutland in 1241.99 Instead of a direct influence of canon law through 
the contribution of Danish or other canon lawyers in the drafting process, could the Swedish 
summoning rules of canon law origin have been copied from the Danish provincial laws?  
The Danish rules on summoning indeed resemble the Swedish ones. According to the Law of 
Scania, the plaintiff had to make his accusation public at a first ting meeting. At the second 
meeting, the defendant had to respond to the charges. If defendants failed to appear, they were 
fined, and failure to show up at the third meeting meant losing the case.100 Similarly, according to 
King Erik’s Law of Zealand, the plaintiff could publicize the transgression against the law at the 
ting. The defendant was then allowed several opportunities to appear, and failure to appear was 
followed by a declaration of outlawry only at the fifth ting.  
In addition to the traditional method of initiating court proceedings, King Erik’s Law of Zealand 
introduced another method, that of private summoning. The plaintiff had two local men deliver the 
summons to the defendant one or two days before the ting session. The summoners had to ensure 
that the defendant was accompanied by two kinsmen, who could testify later to the correctness of 
the summoning.101 
The Law of Jutland also required the plaintiff to publicize his case at a ting meeting. In some 
serious cases, ‘case-initiating’ evidence was needed. According to the Law of Jutland, a defendant 
lacking a valid excuse could postpone his appearance until the fourth ting meeting before losing the 
case by default.102 
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As regards initiating court proceedings, obvious similarities exist between the Danish and Swedish 
provincial laws. In both the Danish and Swedish laws, defendants were allowed several chances to 
appear until they suffered the consequences of contumacy. Some of both the Danish and Swedish 
laws contain detailed rules as to legal reasons for delaying appearance, which testifies to a 
heightened sensitivity towards rendering court proceedings increasingly effective. These types of 
rules were typical of canon law as well. It is impossible to say whether the rules on lawful absence 
or the principle of allowing the defendant several chances to appear in court came to the Swedish 
laws directly from canon law or as mediated via the Danish laws.  
Here we come to the most important difference between the Danish and Swedish provincial laws. 
With the exception of the Law of Zealand, the Danish laws did not yet know summons of the canon 
law type. The oldest of the Swedish laws, the Laws of West and East Gothia, also had public 
denouncement as its default way of initiating a case.103 While some newer Swedish laws still 
mentioned public denouncement, most no longer did. The Law of Uppland (Chapter on Procedure 
Art. 3) still gives public denouncement as the default procedure, but also introduces summons in its 
Chapter on the Church (Art. 12).104 When the newer Swedish provincial laws were put into writing, 
public denouncement as the default way of initiating a case seems to have appeared outdated and 
was replaced by summons transplanted from canon law.105 
One more important difference should be mentioned. The Uppland solution to move the fourth 
session to the defendant’s farmstead and seize his property was unknown in the Danish laws and, 
therefore, must have come directly from canon law. 
We still need to address the tricky question of whether the arrangement of two summons witnesses 
in the Law of Zealand had Roman law origins, as Andersen briefly suggests.106 The Provincial Law 
of East Gothia, and the Land Laws of Kings Magnus Eriksson and Christopher, as explained above, 
had similar arrangements. The only difference was that, by the Swedish laws, two witnesses 
sufficed, whereas in Zealand, the plaintiff had to make sure that two of the defendant’s kinsmen 
were also present when the plaintiff delivered the summons – thus, four extra persons altogether.  
In post-classical Roman law, apparitores were public servants of magistrates. In addition to other 
tasks, the apparitores served as summoners.107 Similar apparitores figured in many ordines 
iudiciarii as well. As so often in ius commune procedure, details vary tremendously from one author 
to another, and from region to region. Although the judge could in principle deliver the summons 
(written or oral) himself, an apparitor (or according to some ordines, two) was often used.108 
Differences between the Nordic solutions and ius commune were, however, considerable. Whether 
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delivered by the judge himself or by his personnel, at ius commune (and in post-classical Rome) the 
judge always approved the summons before its delivery. In the Laws of Zealand and East Gothia, 
and King Magnus Eriksson’s Land Law, this was not the case. There, the two witnesses (and, in 
Zealand, two kinsmen) only passively witnessed the plaintiff serve the summons, which no judge 
had approved beforehand. These may well have been Nordic versions of the ius commune theme, 
and at the same time, they were surely practical ways of avoiding evidentiary difficulties. 
Interestingly, for the first time in Swedish medieval legal history, King Christopher’s Land Law 
required that the judge, either personally or through apparitores, deliver the summons to the 
defendant. King Christopher’s Law thus meant a full-scale adoption of all the essential ius 
commune characteristics of summoning.  
The drafters of the Swedish provincial laws clearly drew inspiration from the innovations that 
canon lawyers produced during an immensely productive thirteenth century. For that, the Danish 
and the early Swedish provincial laws were simply too early, as roughly half a century separated the 
latest of the Danish provincial laws and the oldest Swedish laws from the newer layer of Swedish 
laws put into writing. As Swedish medieval wills and donations demonstrate, the latest canonical 
collections and commentaries were increasingly owned by clerics and institutional libraries in the 
course of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.109 Direct influences from canonical 




The canon law of summons represents the most developed law of its kind from around the time 
when the newest stratum of the Swedish provincial laws – the Laws of East Gothia, Södermanland, 
Helsingland, and Uppland, the most influential of the Swedish provincial laws – was being 
compiled. It is therefore quite understandable that the canon law model found its way into these 
laws. They followed canon law to the extent that we may speak of a legal transplant. The provincial 
laws differed in the details of how they regulated summons, but so did canon law. Some of the laws 
allowed for one, some three, some four, and some six citations before the process was called to a 
halt and the trial was held despite the defendant’s continued absence. The concept of peremptory 
citation was thus introduced. Some of the laws also regulated in detail how the summons was to be 
delivered: by whom, when, and whether witnesses were needed. In some laws, these rules were not 
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put into writing, although there may, nevertheless, have been rules on it. In addition, some of the 
provincial laws also incorporated the canon law rule according to which the court, after a certain 
number of unsuccessful citations, would go to the defendant’s homestead to hold court. The drafters 
of one law also decided to include rules on lawful impediment, also taken from the scholarship of 
canon law.  
Due to the lack of learned lawyers in secular courts, a wholesale reception of canon procedural law 
would have been unthinkable in Uppland or any other Swedish region. The canon law of summons, 
at least in simplified form, could be instituted in the unlearned Swedish environment. Some rules on 
citation, and preferably effective ones, were also critical from the point of view of the secular and 
ecclesiastical rulers, attempting to spread their judicial power into a kinship-dominated, archaic 
society. After all, it was crucial to get the defendants to court in the first place. If they could not be 
forced to appear, the rest of the law mattered little.  
The oldest provincial law contains no norms on summons, which of course does not mean that 
defendants were not summoned in some way. However, the fact that summoning to courts became 
an object of lawgiving in the newest provincial laws indicates increased efforts to render legal 
proceedings more effective than before. These effective means of summoning, and not the silence 
of the more archaic older layer of provincial laws, was the natural choice to settle the matter in the 
laws of the realm. The last medieval realm-wide law, the Law of King Christopher, then further 
tightened the grip of judicial authority on uncooperative defendants.  
The development of the law of summons demonstrates how the latest international innovations in 
procedural law, which the twelfth- and thirteenth-century canonists had developed, were adopted 
first in the Swedish provincial laws and then in the laws of the realm. Without doubt, channels 
existed through which information on the novelties of canon law found their way to Sweden. The 
Church itself, which its bureaucracy and at least some learned personnel, was of course omnipresent 
in Europe. Also in Sweden, the Church used canon law citation in its courts and supervised that it 
was properly interpreted.110 
Swedish students enrolled in the Universities of both Bologna and Paris from the thirteenth century 
onwards, and a system of church stipends developed during the second half of the thirteenth 
century.111 The students were sent to study theology, and we have little knowledge of whether and 
to what extent they acquainted themselves with canon law. It is, however, certainly possible that 
they did, and some may even have bought books, which they brought home.   
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Canon law books were rare in Sweden before the mid-thirteenth century but became considerably 
more abundant from the second half of the century onwards. Not surprisingly, copies of Liber extra 
and Decretum Gratiani figure the most frequently in the sources that Mia Korpiola has studied. 
Commentary works existed in Sweden as well. Of them, Summa super titulis decratalium of 
Gottfredus de Trano was the most common, while works such as Summa aurea of Hostiensis and 
Casus longi decretalium (often attributed to Bernhard of Parma) appeared less frequently. Of actual 
ordines iudiciarii in circulation in late medieval Sweden, at least William of Durand’s Speculum 
iudiciale and Ordo iudiciarius of Tancred deserve a mention.112  
Thus, it is not an exaggeration to say that medieval Swedish canonists and legislators had good or at 
least sufficient access to the major sources of contemporary canon law. The most important 
solutions to the legislative problem concerning citation were available to them.  
 It is therefore not surprising that the most efficient solutions found their way first into some of the 
most influential Swedish provincial laws and then into the realm-wide legislation. 
The canon law of summons, adopted in the Swedish medieval laws, was part of two broader 
developments. First, the rules on summons were probably part of the idea of ordo iudiciarius, 
which was also adopted in Sweden. In Sweden, the rules on summons were always accompanied by 
a separate procedural chapter, which regulated the whole procedure chronologically from beginning 
to end – although some laws were more elaborate on some details than others were. It is not far-
fetched to think that the procedural chapters were in fact the Swedish equivalent of ordines, 
although the Swedish ‘ordines’ were of course legislation, not scholarly literature. Second, the 
Swedish ‘ordines iudiciarii’ with their rules on summons reflect, for their part, the inquisitorial 
principle making its way into the Swedish procedure. The Swedish rulers, just as their counterparts 
elsewhere in Europe, were making a conscious effort to organise court procedures into more 
uniform and efficient form. 
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